The Equal Rights Act was created “for the enforcement of the principles enshrined in article 29 of the Constitution so as to secure equality for women.” Section 2 of the Act provides that “[w]omen and men have equal rights and the same legal status in all spheres of political, economic and social life” and that [a]ll forms of discrimination against women or men on the basis of their sex or marital status are illegal.” The Act provides, among other things, that women and men be paid equally for the same work and that, in employment matters, men shall not be afforded more favorable opportunities than women.
Guyana
Legislation
Domestic Violence Act (1996)
The Domestic Violence Act sets forth the procedures for granting protection orders in situations involving domestic violence. Under Part III of the Act, once a protection order has been granted, a police officer can, without a warrant, enter any premises “if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that a protection order is being violated.” Section 42 of Part IV of the Act provides that, once a police officer has intervened in a case of domestic violence, “the police officer shall as soon as possible take all reasonable measures within his power to prevent the victim of domestic violence from being abused again.”
The Prevention of Discrimination Act recognizes sexual harassment as an act of discrimination subject to a penalty of up to $20,000. The Act defines sexual harassment as “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace or in connection with the performance of work which is threatened or imposed as a condition of employment on the employee or which creates a hostile working environment for the employee.”
The Sexual Offences Act was created “to reform and consolidate the laws relating to sexual offences.” Part II of the Act sets forth the elements of the offenses of rape and sexual assault and defines the meaning of consent, providing that if a defendant raises “consent” as a defense, “the belief must be objectively reasonable” for the defense to succeed. Part II of the Act also defines various categories of sexual offenses against children. Part III of the Act sets parameters for the investigation of sexual offenses, Part IV of the Act defines procedures to be followed at court, and Part V of the Act governs evidentiary standards. Part IX of the Act deals with the prevention of sexual assault and establishes the National Task Force for the Prevention of Sexual Violence.
Domestic Case Law
Applicants McEwan, Clarke, et al. v. Attorney General High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature (2013)
On February 6, 2009, four transgender individuals (A, B, C, D) identifying as female were arrested and charged with both Loitering and Wearing Female Attire. The police detained the Applicants for the entire weekend without explaining the charges against them. Wearing Female Attire is prohibited under Section 153(1)(XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act, chapter 8:02. At the hearing on February 9, 2009, the Chief Magistrate commented that the Applicants were confused about their sexuality and told them they were men, not women, and needed to give their lives to Jesus Christ. The Applicants, who were all unrepresented at the time, pleaded guilty to the charge of Wearing Female Attire. Applicants A, B and D were fined $7,500, and Applicant C was fined $19,500 (Guyanese dollars). The loitering charges were eventually dismissed. The Applicants contacted the Society Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination (SASOD), the Equal Rights Trust’s Guyanese partner, about the case. SASOD agreed to represent Applicants and filed a Notice of Motion challenging the Magistrate’s Court decision and seeking redress. The Applicants argued that the police violated the Constitution because the officers failed to inform them of their arrest and did not permit the Applicants to retain counsel. They also argued that Section 153 (1) (XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act 1893 is: (1) vague and of uncertain scope; (2) irrational and discriminatory on the ground of sex; and (3) a continuing threat to their right to protection against discrimination on the ground of sex and gender under the Constitution. Applicants further argued that, by instructing the Applicants to attend Church and give their lives to Jesus Christ, the Chief Magistrate discriminated against them on the basis of religion, which violated a fundamental norm of the Co-operative of the Republic of Guyana as a secular state in contravention to the Constitution. The Court upheld the Applicants’ claims in relation to their fundamental right to be informed of the reason for their arrest under Article 139 of the Constitution, but rejected all of their other claims. The Court found that the prohibition of cross-dressing for an improper purpose was not unconstitutional gender or sex discrimination, impermissibly vague, or undemocratic. The Court also struck SASOD’s application in full, finding that SASOD did not have standing to be an applicant in the case.