Japan

The defendant-husband, who had joint parental authority with his wife, forcibly took his son away from his mother. The court held that the defendant's act constituted kidnapping, as there were no special circumstances which made the defendant's actions necessary, and the act was "violent and coercive." In addition, the court found that the act of kidnapping the child could not be justified even though the defendant had parental authority.

本件は、被告人である夫が、他方親権者である妻から息子を強制的に連れ去った事件である。最高裁は、被告人である夫がそのような行為に出ることを必要とする特段な事情が認められないことから、その行為はが粗暴で強引であるとして、被告人が親権を持っていたとしても、子の略取は正当化できないとし、未成年者略取罪の成立を認めた。

Person X1 transitioned from female to male. X1 registered as a male and married a woman, X2, in 2008. In 2009, X2 bore a child. In 2012, X1 applied to have the family registry reflect that X1 was the child’s father and that the child was born while X1 and X2 were married. The ward mayor in charge of changes to family registries held that there was a problem with the application because Article 774 of the Civil Law was inapplicable to the child’s situation as the child was not related by blood to X1. X1 did not comply with the ward mayor’s request to fix the application, so the ward mayor filled in the family registry for the child with a blank for father and a note that the child was X2’s oldest son. X1 and X2 filed suit to have X1 added as the child’s father on the grounds that the child should be presumed to be a “legitimately” born child based on Article 772 of the Civil Law. The Supreme Court held that the child should be presumed to be the son of X1, overruling the lower court and the ward mayor’s decision. The court reasoned that under Article 3.1 of the Gender Identity Disorder Law, a transgender man should be treated for all purposes under the law as a man. The court held that this includes being able to marry and have a “legitimate” child. Following this decision, the Ministry of Justice issued a notification on 27 January, 2014 directing that this procedure be followed for any similarly situated families. Subsequently, the state changed the family registry for 45 such couples to reflect that both parents are their children’s parents.

X1は女性だったが、男性になるため、性転換手術を受けた。その後、彼は男性として登録し、2008年に女性のX2と結婚した。その翌年、X2は子どもを出産した。2012年、X1は、X1が子どもの父親であること、子どもがX1とX2の婚姻中に生まれたことを戸籍に反映させることを地方公共団体に請求した。戸籍変更を担当する区長は、子どもがX1と血縁関係にないことから、民法774条の適用を受けられないため、申請に問題があると、子の戸籍に父の欄を空欄にして、子がX2の長男であると記入した。X1とX2は、子が民法772条に基づいて「嫡出子」と推定されるべきであるとして、X1を子の父として加えることを要求し提訴した。最高裁は、X1の子と推定すべきであるとし、下級審および区長の判断を棄却し、「性同一性障害の性別の取り扱いの特例に関する法律」第3条第1項に基づき、トランスジェンダーの男性は、法に基づき、あらことで男性として扱われるべきであるとした。これには、結婚して「正当に」子どもを産むことができることも含まれるとした。この判決を受けて、法務省は2014年1月27日に、同様の状況にある家族に対してこの手続きを行うよう指示する通達を出した。その後、国は、そのようなカップル45組の戸籍を訂正した。

The plaintiff was a physiotherapist in a managerial position at her employer. She requested and was granted maternity leave but was not allowed to return to her position at the end of the maternity leave. She filed a lawsuit against her employer, asserting that there was a violation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law. The Supreme Court found in favor of the plaintiff because the Equal Employment Opportunity Law forbids disadvantaging employees based on the employee’s pregnancy, childbirth, request for maternity leave, or request for transfer to lighter work.

原告は、管理職にあった理学療法士で、育児休業の終了後、元の職に戻れなかったことから、被告の雇用主に対して、男女雇用機会均等法違反に基づいて損害賠償を求めた。最高裁は、男女雇用機会均等法は、妊娠・出産・産前産後休暇の申請・軽易な業務への転換の申請などを理由に従業員に不利益な扱いを禁じていることを理由に、原告を支持した。

The defendant was indicted under the Stalker Regulation Law on a charge of stalking his former girlfriend. The defendant demanded many times by email and phone that she repay costs he incurred while they were dating. The defendant sent a letter to her threatening to distribute nude photos of her if she did not unblock him on her cell phone. The Supreme Court determined that, even though he sent the letter only once, his conduct amounted to “stalking” under the Stalker Regulation Law since his conduct was as a whole persistent and repetitive.

被告人は、元交際相手に対し、交際中にかかった費用の返済をメールや電話で何度も要求し、携帯電話のブロックを解除しなければヌード写真をばら撒くと脅す手紙を送った。最高裁は、手紙を送ったのが1回だけであっても、「つきまとい等」の行為が反復することから、ストーカー規制法の「ストーカー行為」に該当すると判断した。

The defendant committed acts of obscenity upon a young girl. He alleged that it was only for a monetary purpose—to record the act and give the recording to his acquaintance in return for receiving a loan —and that he had no sexual intent. The defendant appealed the High Court’s ruling that sexual intent is not required to establish a prima facie case of indecent assault, which is proscribed by Article 176 of the Japanese Penal Code. He argued that the High Court’s finding was inconsistent with judicial precedent holding that sexual intent is an element of the crime. The Supreme Court, upon noting that the scope of sexual crimes cannot be properly determined without taking into account the views of contemporary society, found that, in the present day, the focus should be on the existence, details, and extent of sexual damage caused to a victim rather than an assailant’s intent. Thus, the Supreme Court, upheld the High Court’s finding and overturned the 47-year-old jurisprudence. The Court found that, while it could not deny that there may be a situation in which the sexual intent of a perpetrator becomes an important factor in finding the crime, it was not reasonable to uniformly require the existence of such a factor for the crime of indecent assault.

被告人は、金を借りようとしたところ、金を貸す条件として若い女の子にわいせつ行為を行い、その行為を撮影するよう指示された。被告人はこれに関して、その行為の目的は金銭を得ることであり、性的意図はなかったと主張した。被告人は、刑法第176条の強制わいせつ罪の成立には性的意図が必要で、高裁判決は以前の判例に違反するとして、強制わいせつ罪が成立するとした高裁判決を不服とした。最高裁は、性犯罪の範囲は社会の受け止め方を考慮しなければ処罰対象を適切に決することができないとし、現代においては、加害者の意図だけでなく、被害者に与えた性的被害の有無、内容、程度に焦点を当てるべきであると判断し、加害者の性的意図が犯罪認定の重要な要素となる場合はあるが、強制わいせつ罪にこの要素の存在を一律に要求することは妥当ではないとして、高裁判決を支持した。

The appellee, a former employee of the appellant’s subsidiary, suffered sexual harassment and stalking from an employee of the appellant’s other subsidiary who shared the same work site with the appellee. The appellant had developed a corporate-group-wide compliance system, which included a consulting desk at which an employee of the appellant or its subsidiaries could raise and discuss any compliance-related matters. The appellee brought the harassment issue to her supervisors at her immediate employer (i.e. the appellant’s subsidiary) twice, but sufficient solutions were not provided, following which she left the company without bringing the issues to the consulting desk. The stalking continued even after her resignation, so her former colleague who still worked at the appellant's subsidiary brought the issue before the appellant through the consulting desk, but it did not provide sufficient solutions either. The question brought before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant (i.e. a parent company of her former immediate employer) bore the duties based on the principle of good faith to provide certain protective measures to the appellant because it had developed the corporate-group-wide compliance system. The Supreme Court found that the appellant was not imposed with such duties in light of particular facts in the case since the appellant did not bring the harassment issue to the consulting desk during her employment. However, in dicta, the Court stated that a parent company, depending on particular facts of the case, can be responsible for providing sufficient solutions to an employee of its subsidiary who is a victim of sexual harassment––failure of which would result in liability for damage based on the principle of good faith––if the parent company provides a system through which the employee could, and actually did, bring an issue of sexual harassment to the parent company’s attention.

上告人の子会社の元契約社員である被上告人は、同じ事業場内で就労していた他の子会社の従業員からセクシャル・ハラスメントやストーカー行為を受けていた。被上告人は、直属の勤務先（上告人の子会社）の上司にこの問題に関して二度相談したが、問題が十分に解決されなかったため、上告人が設置していたグループ会社内全体の社員が事業場内に関する事項を相談できるコンプライアンス相談窓口に相談することなく退職した。その後も被上告人に対するストーカー行為が継続していたため、上告人の子会社に勤務していた被上告人の元同僚は、被上告人のため、上告人の設置したコンプライアンス相談窓口に相談した。しかし、それでも問題は解決されなかった。最高裁では、コンプライアンス相談窓口を設置していたことを理由に、上告人が信義則に基づき一定の付随義務を負うか否かが問題となった。被上告人が在職中にハラスメント問題を相談窓口に申し出なかったことと、本件の特殊な事実関係に照らして、最高裁は上告人が雇用契約上の付随義務を負わないことを確認した。一方で、本件判決は、子会社の従業員がセクシャルハラスメントに遭った際、問題を親会社の相談窓口への申出ることができ、その申出の具体的状況によって、親会社が申出をした者に対し、申出に係る相談の内容等に応じて適切に対応すべき信義則上の義務を負う場合があると判示した。

In this appeal, a child born to unmarried parents appealed the High Court’s finding that a relevant part of the proviso to Article 900.4 of the Japanese Civil Code was not inconsistent with Article 14.1 of the Constitution of Japan, prohibiting discrimination based on race, belief, sex, social status, or lineage. The proviso set forth that the statutory share in inheritance of a child born out of wedlock is half of that of a child in wedlock. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling and found that the proviso was inconsistent with Article 14.1 of the Constitution. In making this finding, the Supreme Court took into account the changes in the following, which have been observed since 1947––the year in which the Japanese Civil Code was revised after World War II: Japanese society, forms of family, legislative acts in foreign countries, and relevant Japanese legal frameworks. The Supreme Court noted that, even though the system of civil marriage is strongly respected in Japanese society, society has come to accept the idea that a child should not suffer disadvantages based on a factor that she/he did not cause or could not change––whether to have been born in or out of wedlock––and that a child’s rights need to be protected and she/he must be given respect as an individual.

本件は、非嫡出子の法定相続分が嫡出子の2分の１とした日本民法第900条第4号但書が日本国憲法第14条第1項に抵触しないとした高裁判断を不服とした事案である。最高裁は、高裁の判決を覆し、但書が無効だと判断した。本判決では、戦後の民法改正が行われた昭和22年以降の日本の社会、家族の実態、さらに諸外国の立法例の変化を考慮し、非嫡出子の在り方に対する国民の意識変化を指摘した。また、日本社会では、法律婚を尊重する意識が幅広く浸透しているが、父母が婚姻関係になかったという，子にとっては自ら選択ないし修正する余地のない事柄を理由としてその子に不利益を及ぼすことは許されず，子の権利を保証すベきである考えも確立されてきている。

A Japanese married couple petitioned for a court order that a Japanese local government accept birth registers for twins born from a surrogate mother in Nevada with the ovum and sperm of the Japanese couple. The state of Nevada, pursuant to its state court, had issued birth certificates for the twins, which showed the Japanese couple as their parents. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling that the birth registers need to be accepted. It stated that Article 118 of the Japanese Civil Proceedings Act prescribes that a final judgment made by a foreign court takes effect in Japan only if it satisfies all enumerated conditions, which include that “the foreign court’s ruling and its proceedings are not contrary to public policy in Japan.” The Supreme Court recalled that the Japanese Civil Code stands on the premise that a mother of a child is a woman who conceived and delivered the child and that a mother-child relationship is established through objective factors such as gestation and delivery. According to the Supreme Court, when a parent-child relationship can be legally established is a matter that forms the basis of the country’s legal order, and factors for finding such a relationship must be unequivocal. Thus, the Court found that a mother-child relationship between the twins and the Japanese wife could not be established, given that the Nevada court’s ruling, which recognized a parent-child relationship contrary to Japanese laws, ran against the public policy in Japan. In its statement, the Supreme Court urged the Japanese legislature to address the issues of parent-child relationships and assisted reproductive technology through legislation.

日本人夫婦がその卵子と精子を使い、ネバダ州在住の米国人女性に双子の子らを懐胎・出産させた。その後、夫婦は日本へ帰国し、が自らが双子の父母であると記載した出身届を区長である抗告人が受理するよう裁判所に申し立てた。これに対し、ネバダ州の裁判所は日本人夫婦を両親とする双子の出生証明書をすでに発行していた。最高裁は、出生届を受理する必要があるとした高裁判決を破棄し、日本の民事訴訟法第118条により、外国の裁判所が下した終局判決は、「その判決及び手続が日本の公序良俗に反しないこと」などの条件を満たした場合にのみ、日本で効力を生じるとし、また、日本の民法上、母子関係の成立の前提は懐胎し出産した女性がこの母である、母子関係の成立は懐胎、出産という客観的な事実により当然に成立することが前提であると述べた。最高裁によると、実親子関係の成立は、国における身分法秩序の根幹を成すものであり、その関係の存否の基準は一律でなければならない。したがって、日本の民法が実親子関係を認めていない者の間にその成立を認めたネバダ州の判決は、日本の公序良俗に反するものであるとして、双子と日本人夫婦との間に親子関係は存在しないと最高裁は判断し、同時に、早急に立法による対応を促した。

This case concerns the custody of a Japanese couple’s son who was born and raised in the United States until the mother, without the father’s consent, took him to Japan when he was 11 years old. Pursuant to the Japanese implementation of The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the father, who was still based in the U.S., petitioned for the return of the son to the U.S. A family court in Tokyo granted the petition. However, the attempt to enforce the order of the court failed as the mother strongly resisted when a court execution officer approached her––the son also voiced his desire to stay in Japan at the time. Subsequently, the father requested habeas corpus relief seeking release of the child. The High Court dismissed the request. In this appeal, the Supreme Court of Japan reversed the High Court’s ruling and remanded the case. In its reasoning, the Supreme Court first recalled its old ruling that care for a child is tantamount to “restraint” within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act and the Habeas Corpus Rules in special circumstances where it cannot be deemed that the child is staying with the care provider based on the child’s free will, even if the child is capable of making her/his own decisions. The Supreme Court found such a special circumstance––undue emotional influence from his mother––existed with respect to the son in light of the fact that he was not capable of making decisions regarding his life when he was taken to Japan, he appeared to have had less than sufficient opportunities to communicate with his father, and he had been largely dependent on his mother. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the restraint at issue was unequivocally unlawful, taking into account that the mother had refused to follow the family court’s order to return the child to the U.S., and that there was no special circumstance in which removing the child would be significantly unjust. This Supreme Court’s unanimous decision may be an indication that the Court will put significant weight on compliance with The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

本件は、日本人夫婦の妻が、夫の同意を得ることなく、米国出身の11歳の息子を米国から日本に連れて帰り、米国にいる夫が東京家庭裁判所に息子の返還命令を申し立た事案である。日本が国際的な親による子の奪取を規定している「ハーグ条約」に加盟したことにより、東京家庭裁判所は返還命令の決定を下した。しかし、執行官が裁判所の命令を執行しようとしたところ、妻が強く抵抗したため、裁判所の命令を執行することができなかった。その後、夫は子の監護等を求めて人身保護請求を求めたが、高裁は夫の請求を棄却した。最高裁は、高裁の判決を破棄し、原審に差し戻した。その理由として、まず、旧判例では、人身保護法及び人身保護規則にいう「拘束」に当たるのは、意思能力がある子の監護について、子が自由意思に基づいて監護者の下にとどまっているとはいえない特段の事情があるときと示していた。本件では、子供が日本に連れて行かれた時点で自分の生活について判断する能力がなかったこと、父親とのコミュニケーションの機会が十分ではなかったと思われること、母親に大きく依存していたことなどから鑑みると、母親からの過度の精神的影響という特別な事情が存在すると最高裁は判断した。さらに、最高裁は、母親が家庭裁判所の返還命令に従わなかったこと、子を連れ去ることが著しく不当となる特段の事情がないことなどを考慮して、問題となっている拘束は紛れもなく違法であると判断した。本最高裁の全員一致による判決は、裁判所が「ハーグ条約」を遵守する姿勢を示している。

The plaintiffs were two male employees who had been temporarily suspended from work and demoted from their managerial positions for sexually harassing female employees by making comments of a sexual nature in the office. The plaintiffs sued the company, seeking a declaratory judgment that such disciplinary actions were void because there were no grounds for such actions, and/or the actions were taken abusively. The High Court found for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s judgment, finding that the disciplinary actions taken against the plaintiffs were not an abuse of the company’s right to take action, and that furthermore the actions did not lack objectively reasonable grounds and were appropriate from a general societal perspective. The Supreme Court reasoned that 1) the plaintiffs had repeatedly made obscene or insulting statements to or about the female employees, despite warnings from superiors, 2) the company had distributed guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment and had held a mandatory seminar on sexual harassment, 3) in many cases, employees who experience sexual harassment may not expressly object due to concerns about damaging relationships with colleagues, despite the distress caused by the harassment, and 4) the plaintiffs, who were in managerial positions, should have recognized the policy and attitude of the company on the issue of sexual harassment as a matter of course.

被上告人らは、上告人の男性従業員2人で、オフィスで女性従業員に性的な発言をしてセクシュアル・ハラスメントを行ったとして、一時的な出勤停止と管理職からの降格処分を受けていた。被上告人らが上告人に対し、上記各処分は懲戒事由を欠き又は懲戒権を濫用したものとして無効であり、上記各降格処分もまた無効であるなどと主張して、出勤停止処分の無効確認や各降格処分前の等級を有する地位にあることの確認等を求めた事案である。高裁は被上告人らを支持したが、最高裁は、被上告人らに対する懲戒処分は、会社の懲戒権を濫用したものではなく、また、客観的に合理的な理由を欠くものでもなく、社会通念上相当であると判断し、高裁の判決を破棄した。最高裁は、(1）原告が上司の警告にもかかわらず、女性従業員に対して卑猥な発言や侮辱的な発言を繰り返していたこと、(2）会社がセクシャル・ハラスメントを禁止するガイドラインを配布し、セクシャル・ハラスメントに関するセミナーを義務的に開催していたこと、(3）多くの場合、セクシャルハラスメントを受けた従業員は、苦痛を感じているにもかかわらず、同僚との関係を懸念して、明確にセクシャル・ハラスメントに反対しない場合が多いこと、(4）管理職であった原告らは、セクシャルハラスメントの問題に関する会社の方針・姿勢を当然認識していたはずであることなどを理由に挙げた。

The defendant was accused of taking and imprisoning four young women in either the guestroom of a hotel or in the defendant’s home. The victims suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the imprisonment. One of the key issues in the case was whether the defendant’s act constituted the crime of Confinement Causing Injury, or only the crime of Confinement. The defendant argued that a psychiatric condition, such as PTSD, should not be regarded as an “injury” under the Criminal Code. The District Court and the High Court dismissed the defendant’s argument, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if the defendant illegally imprisoned the victim and the victim developed continuous and characteristic PTSD symptoms as a result of the imprisonment, the victim’s PTSD could constitute an “injury” under the Criminal Code. Therefore, the defendant’s act constituted Confinement Causing Injury. This was the first Supreme Court precedent which found that a purely psychiatric condition which was not accompanied by a physical manifestation could fall within the meaning of “injury.”

被告は、4人の若い女性をホテルの客室または被告の自宅に連れ込み、監禁した。本件は、被害者が監禁により心的外傷後ストレス障害（PTSD）に苦しんだ事案で、（監禁罪は成立するが）監禁致傷罪の成否が争われたケースである。被告は、PTSDのような精神疾患は、刑法上の「傷害」とみなされるべきではないと主張した。しかし、地裁、高裁、最高裁ともに監禁致傷罪の成立を認めた。最高裁によると、被告が違法に被害者を監禁し、監禁の結果、被害者が継続的かつ特徴的なPTSD症状を発症した場合、被害者のPTSDは刑法上の「傷害」に該当し得るとした。本件では、最高裁は被告人の行為は監禁致傷罪に該当すると判断し、これは、物理的な傷害を伴わない純粋な精神的機能の障害が刑法上の傷害に当たることを初めて認めた最高裁判例である。

The defendant was indicted under the Stalker Regulation Law on a charge of stalking his former girlfriend by sending two rose bouquets and five letters. The defendant argued that the Stalker Regulation Law is unconstitutional because it infringes a “right to fulfill romantic feelings”. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument opining that even if a right to fulfill romantic feelings were to exist, the purpose of the Stalker Regulation Law is legitimate and its contents are reasonable.

The plaintiff exercised her right under Japanese law to reduce her working hours to spend time taking care of her child. The internal policy of her employer stated that employees who did not attend work for 90% or more of work days are ineligible for a bonus. The plaintiff’s employer counted the plaintiff’s shortened working days as absences and refused to pay her a bonus. The plaintiff sued her company for a bonus. The Supreme Court determined that the employer’s internal policy violated public policy and the employer should have counted actual working hours when calculating attendance rate.

The Act on the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims etc. (the “Act”) was enacted to prevent spousal violence. The Act aims to protect victims by establishing a system for notification, counseling, protection and support for self-reliance following an incident of spousal violence. The Act provides that the court shall, upon a petition from the victim, issue a restraining order, exclusion order and prohibition of telephone contact order (collectively, a “Protection Order”) where a victim is highly likely to experience serious psychological or bodily harm due to the actions of his or her spouse or domestic partner. The Act does not cover partners who are in a relationship but live separately. To ensure the effectiveness of the Protection Order, violations of the Act include imprisonment with work or fines. Furthermore, the Act requires that citizens who detect spousal violence make efforts to a Spousal Violence Counseling and Support Center, temporary protection, support worker, or a police officer.

配偶者からの暴力を防止するため、「配偶者からの暴力の防止及び被害者の保護等に関する法律」（以下「本法」）が制定された。本法は、配偶者からの暴力が発生した場合の通報・相談・保護・自立支援の体制を整備し、被害者の保護を図ることを目的としている。また、本法により、配偶者やパートナーの行為により、被害者が深刻な精神的・身体的被害を受ける可能性が高い場合、被害者からの申立てにより、裁判所が接近禁止命令、排除命令、電話連絡禁止命令（以下、総称して「保護命令」）を発令することができるようになった。なお、本法は、交際中であっても別居しているパートナーを対象としていない。保護命令の実効性を高めるため、同法に違反した場合は、懲役または罰金が科せられる。また、同法は、配偶者からの暴力を発見した市民が、配偶者暴力相談支援センター、一時保護、支援員、警察官などに働きかけることを義務づけています。

The Penal Code (the “Code”) covers Japanese criminal law and sentencing. The relevant provisions with respect to gender justice issues in the Code are Rape, Gang Rape, Forcible Indecency, and Inducement to Promiscuous Intercourse. Rape was initially classified as a crime only involving female victims, but was amended to include men in 2017. The Code states that a person who commits one of more of the listed crimes shall be punished by imprisonment with work for life, or for a definite term corresponding to the gravity of a crime. Further, based on the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” adopted by the United Nations, the Code was amended in 2005 to include the crime of Human Trafficking. Under the amendment, selling or purchasing a human is a crime, with the criminal punishment being more severe in cases with the purpose of profit, indecency, or marriage.

刑法は、犯罪と刑罰を規定している法律である。刑法の中で、ジェンダー・ジャスティスに関連する条項は、強姦、集団強姦、強制わいせつ、淫乱性交誘引が含まれる。強姦は当初、女性の被害者のみを対象とした犯罪として分類されていたが、2017年に男性も対象とされるよう刑法が改正された。同法では、列挙された犯罪の1つ以上を犯した者は、終身刑または罪の重さに応じた有期懲役に処される。 さらに、国連の「国際的な組織犯罪の防止に関する国際連合条約を補足する人（特に女性及び児童）の取引を防止し、抑止し及び処罰するための議定書」に基づき、2005年に刑法が改正され、人身売買が追加された。本改正により、人身売買が犯罪となり、営利目的、わいせつ目的、結婚目的で人身売買した場合は刑事罰がさらに重くなる。